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Abstract In the ethical debate over synthetic biology the
formula ‘‘playing god’’ is widely used in order to attack
this new branch of biotechnology. The article analyses,
contextualizes and criticises this usage with respect to the
theological concepts of creation, sin and humans as created
in the image of God. Against the background of these
theological understandings an ethical corridor of how to
responsibly cope with the societal challenges of synthetic
biology is presented.
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Worries
‘‘Playing God’’—this reproach has accompanied modern
biotechnology from its very beginnings. Almost every step
forward in research has provoked vehement protest against
the disregarding of creation: anaesthesia against pain, the
birth control pill, transplantation medicine and diagnosing
brain death, stem cell research and genetic engineering and
many more innovations were faced with this reproach
(Ramsey 1970; Chadwick 1989; Coady 2009).
Whenever this formula is used, religious associations are
supposed to be evoked in the recipients: it identiﬁes par-
ticularly relevant issues, questions of ultimate concern,
which must be handled with due respect. In a situation, in
which mortal man sets about claiming tasks, functions or
even the being of God, who is usually conceived as eternal,
the illocutionary force of ‘‘playing God’’ becomes obvious:
it encodes a reproach rather than praise. Considering the
concept of ‘‘play’’, the latter would also be conceivable, at
least theoretically and assuming an unbiased hearer. Usu-
ally governed by a pessimistic view of civilization, the
phrase conveys that man in general or speciﬁc individuals
have transgressed allegedly ﬁxed limits that establish a
certain order. If human beings try to conquer the position of
the one who embodies the most fundamental difference
from mankind, namely God, they are suspected of exceed-
ing the limits of man and thus of responsible behaviour.
Playing God arouses the suspicion of megalomania.
The secular philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin rejects
this use of the expression ‘‘playing God’’ in biopolitical
discourse (Dworkin 2000). He accuses everyone using this
phrase of being intellectually and morally dishonest. Cer-
tainly, it is irritating to observe that the established dif-
ferentiation between matters that must be humbly accepted
and those that can be shaped by humans begins to blur.
According to Dworkin, however, it is not a recent phe-
nomenon, i.e. a phenomenon of the era of modern bio-
technology, that humans have begun to rebel against
seemingly hostile nature. By contrast, overstepping
boundaries actually belongs to the very nature of man and
biotechnology is qualitatively nothing new. Moreover, he
asks whether there is anybody who does not proﬁt from
these very innovations, which we then criticize arrogantly
in public debates. The accusation of playing God, from
his point of view, serves as a repository for reactionary
conservatives, who anxiously reject the principally non-
rejectable cultural duty of man to shape the world.
The American theologian Willem B. Drees adds further
theological aspects to Dworkin’s interpretation of ‘‘playing
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God’’ is an indirect expression of strong unease. He attri-
butes this to the observation that the undermining of old-
established cultural structures does not only lead to changes
in the image of man, but also in the image of God. One
might argue that it is not surprising that these images cor-
relate. Nevertheless, religious individuals cannot be reas-
sured by the anti-religious assertion that images of God are
mere projections of anthropology on the hereafter. They
have to account for the way they keep up their conﬁdence in
God, who helps them to handle individual and social con-
tingency. Just as Bonhoeffer in his famous prison letters
(Bonhoeffer 1997), Drees ﬁnds that whenever this conﬁ-
dence is shaken, the ‘‘playing God’’-reproach against
modern technologies is based on an inadequate concept of
God as a ‘‘God of the Gaps’’. As soon as such puzzles are
solved, God is marginalized again—and those who entrench
themselves behind the ‘‘playing God’’-reproach in the dis-
cussion of modern technologies actually feel this. In order
to avoid the challenge and to preserve one’s own image of
God and the usually associated cultural (moral, ritual and
political) procedures, one turns against the new possibilities
and its representatives with emphatically pronounced
aggression. Even though this is effectively employed in
image cultivation, the propagated ideals are not at all put
into practice, which corresponds to Dworkin’s predictions.
Even if one principally agrees to Dworkin’s and Drees’s
criticism of the ‘‘playing God’’-formula, one might still
ﬁnd some instances in which the reproach can be justiﬁed
with respect to speciﬁc technologies. Perhaps, or even
obviously, there are certain limits to seemingly unlimited
scientiﬁc progress. Transgressing such limits is not only
practically unwise, but ethically irresponsible. Two kinds
of reasons can be formulated for an expectable or even
unavoidable rejection: the technologies in question could
be, following the terminology of ethics, consequentially
irresponsible, i.e. their consequences would be unaccept-
able. In such a case, the risks are high and likely to arise. In
another scenario, a technology could be deontologically
reprehensible, i.e. certain duties would be violated and the
actions themselves would have to be considered objec-
tionable. Actions are categorized as reprehensible if, apart
from continuing disagreements in specialized ethical dis-
course, the vast majority of people says: ‘‘You mustn’t do
that!’’—e.g. torture. Especially in deﬁning reprehensibility,
religious and non-religious argumentations diverge. Nev-
ertheless, as a rule, reference to deeply rooted cultural
assets sufﬁces to reach consensus on a general duty to
refrain from such actions.
It is very remarkable indeed that the possibilities arising
from one of the youngest branches of modern biotechnol-
ogy, namely synthetic biology, have been faced with a
concerted attack by ‘‘playing God’’-critics. The use of this
phrase is not limited to sanctimoniously disquieted debates
anymore, but it can be encountered in many recent ethical
publications on synthetic biology (e.g. ETC. Group 2007;
Balmer and Martin 2008; Schmidt et al. 2008; Schmidt et al.
2009a; Bedau and Parke 2009). On the one hand, it insinu-
ates unease about cultural implications. On the other hand,
theauthorsdonotdenytheseriousnessoftheproblem,since,
in fact, synthetic biology might question the boundaries
between the animate and the inanimate. Religious cultural
traditions, however, deﬁne this as a divine privilege and
even if one does not believe in God anymore, the guiding
function of the religious motive for guarding this funda-
mental boundary is still widely appreciated. Therefore, the
question of ‘‘playing God’’ is considered thoroughly even
though the intellectual substance of the reﬂections varies.
Synthetic biology—life 2.0?
Why could the religious or pseudo-religious worry that this
technology means ‘‘playing God’’ be utterly baseless? With
regard to the history of science and technology, synthetic
biology has certainly been a new and, particularly for
religious people, a disquieting development. This can be
traced back to the systematic linking of basic scientiﬁc
research with engineering, which has lead to a paradigm
shift. Of course, it is well known: Technologies suggested
by basic research can actually be put into practice and
several technical innovations work even before they are
analysed and understood—both procedures are realized in
present-day projects. What is particularly innovative about
synthetic biology is that models originally developed for
engineering are now used in order to understand and then
reproduce the fundamentals of life. The results of current
research are still fragmentary, concentrating on details.
Nonetheless, this young ﬁeld of research is driven by a
revolutionary vision of science: Life is to be reconstructed
from inanimate material. Believing the far-reaching
promises (with their certainly not incidental commercial
appeal), active substances for medical and pharmaceutical
applications, but also for environmental care will be
developed by means of these new organisms. The most
tempting vision is designing new sorts of biofuel to replace
fossil fuel.
The innovation of synthetic biology is not about creating
new life. From time immemorial, this has been tried by
diverse methods of breeding, which have been reﬁned
continuously and ﬁnally reached their peak in cloning. In
the cultural memory of mankind, this form of biotech-
nology is commonly approved as normal and morally
justiﬁable. Yet, using inanimate material for the production
of entities fulﬁlling widely accepted criteria of life (namely
metabolism, reactions to the environment, variability, i.e.
evolutionary ﬂexibility from generation to generation)
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Taking into account that the boundary between life and the
inanimate plays a fundamental role in the governing and
stabilizing power of the common sense and of many reli-
gions, it is apparent that any damage to this principle would
be irreconcilable with these world views.
The heart of many religions, including biblical tradition,
is touched when science questions the privilege of the deity
or God to decide on the transitions between life and the
inanimate. Hence, it seems for many religious people
plausible to identify synthetic biology with a new and
formerly unknown overstepping of this boundary. Instead
of manipulating selected features of the genome as it is
done in conventional gene technology, man sets about to
create a creatio a novo. Correspondingly, Giovanni Maio
and his team have lately published a report for the Swiss
Federal Ethics Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology,
in which they conﬁrm that synthetic biology has lead to an
alarming paradigm shift from homo faber to homo creator.
The authors point out that the respect for life might be
weakened if humans lay claim to the position of the sov-
ereign creator (Boldt et al. 2008; cf. Boldt and Mu ¨ller
2008). Under these circumstances, ﬁerce ontological,
philosophical, but also political and religious debates seem
inevitable: Is artiﬁcial life real life? Do we have to prevent
research in this ﬁeld? Which consequences may arise from
the possibility to produce life from inanimate material?
The speciﬁc challenge to theological ethics
In the young, but very dynamic ethical debate about syn-
thetic biology (Schmidt et al. 2009b) and expectable cul-
tural conﬂicts, theological ethics should, in my opinion,
fulﬁl the function of the sober-minded observer: Does
research, by establishing such technologies, consciously or
subconsciously introduce changes in the image of man?
Does it jeopardize and (irreversibly) overstep carefully
deﬁned boundaries? Are religious conceptions or practices
affected? Therefore, the ‘‘playing God’’-motive belongs to
the issues that must be included in ethical considerations.
Regarding the often unreﬂective use of the traditionally
religious formula, there is a need for establishing a con-
structive and critical distance to this phrase and its (mis-)
use. For this purpose, the compatibility of the phrase within
Christian tradition, ecclesiastical procedures and sources
must be examined. The results will help to decide on the
usefulness of the formula in public debates. In the fol-
lowing, the inner perspective of theological reﬂections is
discussed ﬁrst. Then, the stances of the academic and non-
academic public and answers will be introduced and the
question will be answered whether the development of new
organisms from inanimate material is consistent with the
vocation of man or whether it means interfering in the
domain of God. In other words: Does man act as co-creator
Dei (when realizing the optimistic vision of a creatio a
novo) or does he fundamentally contradict his place in
God’s creation and act, in theological terms, sinfully? This
question does not cover the entire ethical explosiveness of
synthetic biology. The often debated issues of biosecurity,
biosafety and access, however, are treated in other contri-
butions to this volume. Thus, I will concentrate on the
speciﬁc challenge for theology: Which impacts does the
sudden possibility of manipulating the boundary between
life and the inanimate nature have on our human self-
conception and our image of God?
Synthetic biology: participation in creation or sin?
The range of different interpretations
There are several possibilities for a theological-historical
interpretation of the creation of life from inanimate
material in religious contexts. Theoretically, we might
re-identify an adoption of the famous dominium terrae (the
divine commission to humankind to rule over the earth
according to Gen 1:28). Assuming a favourable view on
modern biotechnology, one might refer to human intellect.
This gift might place the obligation on man to participate in
the new creation, the Kingdom of Heaven. In the late
nineteenth century, scientiﬁc progress was identiﬁed with
the striving for the Kingdom of God. Comparable ideas of
progress can be encountered in recent American systematic
theologies by Ted Peters (2008) or Anne Foerst (2004):
Man’s position is very close to the co-creator Dei,a sh e
systematically continues God’s creation. But is this in tune
with the theological concept of creation?
At the other end of the scale, the sceptics of this tech-
nology rather rely on pretended biblical evidence when
judging on synthetic biology and its relation to the divine
privilege of creation. The motive ‘‘God is the Lord of life’’
resounds throughout the Old Testament, especially in
Genesis 3:22 and later in the statement that all blood
belongs to the property of God, who gives and also takes it
(Gen 9:4). If life in general belongs to God, it is argued,
man is not authorized to question the distribution of
properties. Apart form the obvious, performative contra-
diction (noting that humans have always been deciding on
life and non-life), we have to ask whether the manipulation
of the biosphere is on the same level as God’s creation.
‘Creation’—systematic theologically
Hermeneutic reﬂection is a reliable way to describe the
emphatically claimed continuity of divine and human act-
ing on the one hand, and, on the other, the allegedly
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God as the creator and biotechnology. The concept of
creation and particularly its possibilities and limits com-
pared to these two other approaches must be considered.
Hence, the question has to be settled whether speciﬁc,
isolated human actions are qualitatively similar to God’s
creative doing and may therefore affect or replace it.
Correspondingly, the notion of creation must be clari-
ﬁed. The fruitful interaction of systematic theology, exe-
gesis and biblical theology has led to an insight which is
highly relevant in our context: Creation is not simply a
given fact, but it is determined by a speciﬁc interpretation
of the world. Against the ‘‘it was good’’ (Gen 1), which is
not always experienced, a hermeneutic perspective helps to
establish an encouraging counterpoint—existential, prais-
ing, but also complaining. The insights gained by this
approach go beyond creation as a given fact and trace out
ways for an adequate coping with the world in which we
live. Being allowed to interpret something from the angle
of belief may result in questioning common social and
scientiﬁc conceptions.
The perception of something as being created cannot be
fathomed by human consciousness itself, but it paves the
way for the believer to a new interpretation of something
that exists. Something is perceived as something (namely
as creation, i.e. from the believed perspective of God). This
is how the world, or its status as being given, addresses us
or presents itself to us as a parable—an idea contributed by
Oswald Bayer and Christian Link (Link 1976; Bayer 1986).
The concept of something ‘being given’ is highly ambiv-
alent. Applied to our topic, the given world (i.e. in our case
nature) does not give us any hint as to how we are supposed
to handle it, unless we believe in creation. The handling of
the world is oriented at cultural patterns of interpretation,
including, besides the concept of creation, the depiction of
the world as a stage for human activity or as a transitional
stage into the sphere of ideas.
Misconceptions of creation
Knowing that creation is not just a given fact, but that it
explains the often opaque conditions of nature and world, it
must be clariﬁed in which ways ‘creation’ determines the
actions of man. Where could limits be deﬁned, which
might possibly restrict human actions?
Firstly, we should consider which aspects of the world
are not explicitly addressed by the conception of ‘creation’:
Whoever perceives the world as a product of creation
does plead for a strict separation of world and God. Cre-
ation and pantheism are incompatible. Creation demands
from the believer a strict differentiation between creator
and creature. From the perspective of Christian faith, this
difference cannot be overcome by man, but exclusively by
God’s initiative arising from his free, loyal affection.
Believing in the concept of creation excludes the thesis that
God has turned away from the world he created. This also
explains the irreconcilability of deism and the idea of a
creatio continua within the Christian doctrine of creation.
The same holds for the speculation that instead of a
benevolent creator, a demiurg, i.e. an inferior god, created
the world. For this reason, Manichaean Gnosticism con-
tradicts the biblical interpretation of the world as a
creation.
Creation as original and preserving loyalty of God
Against the background of these deﬁnitions, creation as a
model of interpretation, which is only available for the
believer, paves the way for further perceptions of the world
as a parable (Link 1991). Since the middle of the twentieth
century, there have been great debates on the relation of
creation and history in various schools of Old Testament
research. They have shown in unison that through all tra-
ditions, ‘creation’ is not primarily linked to the past, e.g. in
order to utilize it for a scientiﬁc explanation of the cos-
mogony of the world. On the contrary, Genesis 1–3 and
Rev 21–22 are used as a frame in the Christian bible to
illustrate the connection between past and future, of origin
and redeeming eschatological fulﬁllment. The composition
of the bible suggests that past and future, origin and hope
are supposed to function as a frame for our understanding
of the present (Moltmann 1985).
What does the interpretative category ‘creation’ say
about the world by talking about God as the creator?
Whenever God creates something, it is something opposite
to him. He restricts himself, but loyally and reliably grants
room and time to it. For God’s self-restriction and loyalty
to offer a partner different from him time and room, i.e. for
the willingness to create, the Hebrew bible has a special
word without any known analogies: bara. It is only
attributed to God. If God is referred to as bore, this fun-
damental issue is addressed, i.e. the creation of the world as
a whole, the ability to lovingly create an opposite and the
will to inﬁnitely preserve it in its ﬁniteness. These are
exclusively divine attributes—a human being can impos-
sibly be a bore in this very sense (Kesser 2008). In my
opinion, the topos that all blood is the property of God
symbolizes, beyond all mythological language and ritual-
izing practices, precisely this difference: It is the categor-
ical difference between God’s creative doing and human
acting, which man cannot neutralize on his own. This idea
of the creatio ex nihilo, which was added to biblical tra-
dition relatively late, points to this purely divine, initial and
continuing creativeness. ‘Creation’ in systematic theolog-
ical terminology as opposed to every-day language is not a
single act. Rather, it is radical, the root of all, the divine
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that man is obviously not capable of.
Conclusions for the research question
How can we react to the statement based on the allegedly
literal interpretation of the bible that ‘‘something like
synthetic biology attacks the divine domain as man tries to
breathe life to something inanimate’’? Taken that the
considerations on the meaning of God’s creation above are
correct, such theses can be rejected as unsound: Man can
principally not act like God. Drawing upon theological
conceptions of creation could therefore be one way to
defend oneself against the ‘‘playing God’’-reproach in the
controversy about biotechnologies including synthetic
biology. It might even be argued that the worry that man
could manipulate God’s creation reveals a fundamental
misconception of God. Mistakenly and inadequately, God
is seen as ﬁghting the competition with man for the job of a
super-engineer (Evers 2009).
Synthetic biology as a sin?
On the difﬁculty of declaring isolated deeds as sins
This intermediate conclusion on the ‘‘playing God’’-
reproach shows only one side of the coin: If humans cannot
be co-creatores Dei, they cannot even pretend to be so,
even if they are all appointed to be cooperatores Dei
(cooperators of God), which was an undisputed thesis
among the reformers. Doesn’t synthetic biology express the
human wish of being God, arrogance, hubris, a destructive
fantasy of omnipotence? Are such actions not sinful?
In Protestant theology, the identiﬁcation of isolated
deeds as sins is widely regarded as a difﬁcult issue—with
all ambivalences resulting from this (Gestrich 2003).
Undoubtedly, there have always been experiments and
situations in which not only the original sin of man, but an
additional sin originating from a speciﬁc decision made by
an individual or an organization has been committed. From
the stance of the reformers, sins are multifarious and hard
to identify—good deeds are done in the name of the evil
and vice versa. Luther’s example of the good tree, which
carries good fruits, does not deny that even in the justiﬁed,
the power of sin is still at work. There is no analytically
necessary connection between being and acting, but much
uncertainty.
Even if the permanent failure of man to live up to his
god-given position in creation is interpreted as an original
sin, it is virtually impossible to track down the exact deeds
in which this original sin manifests itself. The difﬁculty of
identifying sins is further elaborated on in Karl Barth’s
impressive theological model of sin. Barth demonstrates
human failure by contrasting man’s behaviour with the life
of Jesus Christ, who, by ideally fulﬁlling the divinely
determined function of man in creation, brought about
reconciliation. According to this Christian model of rec-
onciliation and the theology of sins deduced from it, sins
are situation-dependent and may not only manifest them-
selves in arrogance, but similarly in lethargy or lies (Barth
1956–1962).
Applied to the issue of synthetic biology, the argu-
mentation of both, supporters and opponents, arouses sus-
picion. Those who are ready to develop high-risk
applications of this technology might be blamed for their
fantasies of omnipotence, depicting the wish to gain control
over life. In such a case, any sense of respect for life as
something given would be lost. Yet, those who call for a
ban on synthetic biological research might be blamed for
their lethargy, despondency, and for shirking responsibil-
ity. After all, we cannot rule out the possibility that,
assuming concrete situations in life, neglecting research
could have grave consequences, e.g. with regard to resis-
tant types of viruses.
A revealing contrast: imago Dei as undeniable
responsibility
Instead of identifying an action or a whole ﬁeld of research
as sinful, we must take more notice of imago Dei as an
honouring of the human being, which can be read from
God’s affection in his covenant and from the life of Jesus
Christ. As a term of theological anthropology, imago Dei
does not label man as the chosen creature that possesses
divine qualities. Unlike animals, human beings are equip-
ped with the skills of reﬂection, of forming concepts and
with a potential for self-distance, traditionally referred to as
reason. Nevertheless, according to Protestant theology,
these qualities are not the core of the noble category ‘imago
Dei’ (Dabrock et al. 2004). Rather, it stresses the enno-
blement of man through the direct address by God. This
status of being addressed by God is granted to man—nei-
ther can he actively acquire it, nor is he principally entitled
to receive it. This circumstance, however, is inextricably
linked to obligations: From the perspective of Christian
tradition, God charges man with the responsibility for his
fellow humans and all other creatures and may even
demand basic equality among men, which is not naturally
given for various worldly reasons.
The noble quality of the imago Dei is another, religious
hermeneutical model for critically reviewing human
actions. Despite his failure, which he is well-aware of, man
is called to act in accordance with his status as imago Dei.
The dominium terrae is, indeed, realized beyond Eden, i.e.
under the condition of sin—or in non-theological terms:
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human life is always marked by violence. This is, however,
not justiﬁed by the divinely imposed duty to exercise
stewardship over creation. Against the background of the
imago Dei, this duty must not be misunderstood as a per-
mission to ruthlessly oppress others, but it calls for a
responsible integration of man into the community of all
creatures. Under these circumstances, the unique respon-
sibility of man is obvious. This insight shows that, in
biblical tradition, responsibility is a strongly anthropocen-
tric term. It is part of this responsibility to differentiate
between the beneﬁcial and the inimical. This differentia-
tion must be independent from one’s own beneﬁt and be
governed by the reverence for the unity of life in its bio-
diversity. Doing justice to the imago Dei thus involves
paying tribute to the loyalty of God as the creator despite
all setbacks, i.e. in theological terms, sinfulness, which
manifests itself in arrogance, lethargy and lies.
Conclusions for our research question
It can be concluded that synthetic biology, per se, is not
sinful—which, by the way, holds for nearly all human
activities. Rather, research and applications in this ﬁeld
may, just like any other activity, become misled by the
power of sin and result in failure. Whether that is the case
or whether human beings sinfully utilize new technologies,
respectively, can be evaluated and understood by consid-
ering the implications of the imago Dei—the speciﬁcally
human status, which, unimpeded by sin, is or should be the
driving force for a responsible commitment to creation.
1
The considerations above have shown that synthetic
biology as such does not mean ‘‘playing God’’, since the
power to create (in the strict sense of bara) is exclusively
divine and cannot be claimed by human beings. Similarly
unfounded is the suspicion that this branch of science
marks the striking failure of man to accept his position and
duties within creation. There are many conceivable situa-
tions in which non-compliance with God’s will occurs. The
identiﬁcation of human failure or sinful behaviour is very
complex and cannot be facilitated by principally con-
demning speciﬁc, isolated deeds or research disciplines.
Such a procedure would have to be based on very con-
vincing reasons. It would have to endanger, obviously and
intrinsically, the existence of humanity or its natural
resources or the technology would have to show an
alarming potential for misuse. Nevertheless, even if such
conditions of an intrinsic ‘‘sinful deed’’ were not met,
synthetic biology should not obtain a carte blanche, as
human actions have to be governed by the role model of a
gentle and respectful handling of creation.
Perspectives of theological ethics on synthetic
biology—seven theses
How can the results of the theological examination of our
problem—i.e. synthetic biology neither usurps the divine
domain, nor is it a sin, nor an ethically unproblematic
issue—be transferred to the public and pluralistic debate on
synthetic biology?
I will summarize my reﬂections about the topic in seven
theses. Overlappings of theological statements with non-
theological remarks do not indicate a deﬁcit in theological
reasoning. Theological ethics does not isolate from public
reasoning, but vividly contributes to it (Thiemann 1996).
Even the assumption that reference to God lays the foun-
dations for understanding the nature of man and his actions
does not keep theology from proﬁting from a primarily
non-religious debate. This might turn out to foster a fruitful
exchange of arguments between representatives of differ-
ent world views and religions, which is supposed to lead to
a consensus on how to use synthetic biology in compliance
with relevant conceptions of ‘the good’. One should,
however, not be deluded by the fallacy that public rea-
soning on responsible synthetic biological research and its
applications could work without any reference to norma-
tive and evaluative preconditions. This misinterpretation
directly leads into two traps: ﬁrstly, it obstructs our sense
for hidden assumptions—a drawback we cannot afford in
controversial discussions. Secondly, there is the danger of
losing one’s motivation for acting with foresight, if human
acting in general becomes disconnected from constructions
of human identity and from the sense for the meaning of
life. It is exactly these functions that are lie with theolog-
ical ethics, i.e. accompanying public reasoning and relating
the issues in question with the sources of meaning for
human life, which make it an indispensable discipline in
future debates (Dabrock et al. 2004). Against this back-
ground the following seven theses must be read:
1. Synthetic biology is liable to attract scandals on the
one hand and to inspire fantasies of omnipotence on
the other. This is due to the fact that it is on the point of
breaking through a boundary deeply rooted in human
cultural memory by penetrating into a domain that is
believed to be exclusively reserved to the divine.
2. This quasi-religious misconception in both camps can
be counteracted and limited by systematic theology
and theological ethics in demythologizing the assess-
ments of synthetic biology mentioned above. Theo-
logical concepts of creation and sin show that this ﬁeld
1 Which ethical consequences must be drawn from this approach will
be outlined in the following chapter.
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divine domain. Nor can we brand this technology per
se, i.e. deontologically, as being more reprehensible
than any other conceivable technology, human action
or institution.
3. If we are not willing to grant a carte blanche to
synthetic biology, but rather choose to orient ourselves
at the role model of preserving ecological variety, we
have to consider the following aspects: The risks of all
known and all future biotechnologies can only be
evaluated with regard to their durability, their exact
purpose, their social relevance and, ﬁnally, to their
level of safety and security. We have to answer the
question about the probability of unintended damage
or harm and also of misuse. How extensive is the
manipulation? Which established or establishable
possibilities of intervention are available to react to
unexpected developments in authorized projects?
4. Wherever such questions are supposed to be answered
concretely, it seems wise neither to condemn nor to
welcome synthetic biology in general. Rather, we are
asked to apply consequentialist criteria to every single
synthetic biological research project or application to
ﬁnd out whether it is responsible and thus justiﬁable.
5. Nevertheless, the ethical challenge of synthetic bio-
logical projects is not completely determined by its
expectable consequences and side effects. The general
public has a right to question every discipline or
branch of research as to its social and ecological
compatibility. Criteria such as social and ecological
sustainability, preservation of biodiversity, the speciﬁc
network underlying a system and reversibility of
decisions are important indicators for the ethical (il-)
legitimacy of a speciﬁc project. It is hardly surprising
that these criteria, which are largely shared by
theological and non-theological ethics, are themselves
open to interpretation. Once caught up in the machin-
ery of political decision making with its legal
restrictions, these initial considerations will be varied
and transformed. In this situation, theological and
non-theological ethicist must keep a critical eye on
these transformations. Such mechanisms of power
which operate beneath the surface must be uncovered
and made public. Common attitudes like spontaneous
risk-taking or reactionary tendencies are not to be
identiﬁed with religion. A certain degree of sensitivity
for such non-moral ways of interpretation prevents
rash moralizing—and warning against this also
belongs to the responsibilities of ethics.
6. In societies marked by the mass media, exaggerated
expectations, both optimistic and pessimistic, of syn-
thetic biology as a new ﬁeld of research can be
encountered. The societal system of media works
according to the code ‘attention/non-attention’. This
code is not identical to the differentiation ‘true/untrue’.
For this reason, it is not only absolutely legitimate, but
worth supporting that an intensive public debate about
these new technologies is initiated and realized. If
traditional images of man, the world and of God are
questioned, if people are challenged to modify their
ideas, there is too much at stake and even more to
discuss.
7. To these debates, theological ethics will not only add
the above-mentioned dogmatic or religious hermeneu-
tical perspectives. The idea of principal public partic-
ipation in all social issues, which ensues from human
dignity and the granting of priority to the potentially
worse-off, prompts theological ethics to intensify
exactly those discussions, which might involve funda-
mental irritations. Especially the urgency of the
question what life actually is, might be increased by
synthetic biology. When noticing, however, that the
reproduction of the simplest bacterium is extremely
difﬁcult if not impossible, people might want to pause
in amazement about the magniﬁcence and complexity
of nature—or creation, from the perspective of the
believer.
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